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Abstract 
Credit Unions have a number of advantages to offer customers relative to many banks and one of 
the reasons may be due to the way that their employees work. This paper will investigate 
whether employees at credit unions are more productive than bank employees. Theoretical 
arguments as to why this may be expected from a credit cooperative will be explored and then a 
look at the practice at the macro and micro levels will be explored. Data will be drawn from a 
sample from the Hurricane Katrina ravaged area gathered by the author through a questionnaire, 
interviews and available online sources.  An analysis of national data on U.S. banks and credit 
unions from 1994-2006 complements this micro data set. The findings from the micro data set 
are confirmed in the national survey. Knowing the relative strengths of credit unions could help 
to develop new resources for credit union members and help keep a competitive advantage.  
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Section I: Introduction 
     This paper will compare employee productivity of credit union employees with employees 
who work at commercial banks. Credit unions being financial cooperatives and by law 
circumscribed in their financial practices may be expected to behave somewhat differently than 
other financial institutions. Banks and credit unions in the United States are fierce competitors, 
but many times service different niches as intermediaries.  I originally became interested in this 
topic when comparing the resiliency of financial institutions after the Hurricane Katrina disaster 
that struck New Orleans and the Mississippi coast in August 2005. After comparing banks and 
credit unions in the heavily affected region the evidence pointed to an advantage that credit 
unions have in that their employees often are responsible for a greater number of assets. The 
evidence from this relatively small database will be presented and discussed later in the paper. 
This led me to wonder whether the same type of advantage existed across the whole country.  To 
assess whether the productivity advantage found in the micro data set was a fluke that was in part 
due to the circumstances surrounding the devastation or for other regional causes or something 
more common, data was gathered on all credit unions and banks in the United States from 1994 
to 2006. Assets per employee for both types of institutions were correlated with a number of 
factors and controls. Using a variety of specifications the results indicate that credit unions make 
more efficient use of their employees. The exact cause of this greater efficiency when controlling 
for a number of exogenous factors is not clear, but the cooperative institutional structure surely 
may be a part. The post-Katrina behavior of credit unions highlighted the strength of feelings that 
often made employees, members and other credit unions go “the extra mile” to help out. This 
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internal cohesion and network potency made it possible to offer services that would have 
otherwise been unavailable.  
     A number of the factors that may explain this productivity advantage are difficult to gauge.  
Overtime hours, volunteer hours, aid given from local or national sources, strength of working 
networks, etc. are just a few of the items that even at the micro level were difficult to get 
meaningful data on. When considering the national level and banks as well, this data becomes 
almost impossible to find. By constructing a large panel over time a number of controls for 
locality and size allow a comparison bank and credit union performance on a broad basis. Even 
at the national level credit unions were consistently found to have a positive impact on employee 
productivity using a variety of techniques and specifications.  
     The second section will look at theories of corporate forms in the financial industry. The third 
section will look at the data gathered and the empirical approach. The fourth section will discuss 
the results from the data and the final section will discuss policy implications and future 
research.  
 
Section II: Theory  
     There are a number of reasons in the literature of the firm to suggest why we might expect a 
higher marginal or average product of labor from firms that are cooperative in nature. The Ward-
Vanek-Domar model, sometimes referred to as the Illyrian firm, conjectures that a workers’ 
cooperative would maximize income per worker. This maximization of income per worker 
results theoretically at the peak of the average product of labor. This result would typically mean 
a higher marginal product of labor than would be found in a typical profit maximizing firm.    
There have been quite a few criticisms of some of the predictions from this model such as a 
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backward bending output supply curve and inelasticity, but this model has formed the basis for 
many cooperative models and there has been quite a bit of supporting evidence for low output 
and input elasticity (e.g., Craig and Pencavel 1995 and Bermen 1967). Certainly it would not be 
appropriate to characterize credit unions as worker cooperatives, but their relatively small size 
typically and democratic structure allow for some similarities in practice (e.g., lower CEO to 
base pay ratios).  
     Probably the most interesting literature related to the difference in performance between 
cooperative firms and traditional firms comes from the literature on high performance human 
resource practices. Studies by Jones et al (2006), Ichniowski et al (1997) and Whyte and Whyte 
(1991) are part of a large literature looking inside the firm to compensation, management structures 
and innovative labor practices. Companies that offer innovative compensation and participatory 
schemes that reach out to almost all employees are typically found to be more productive. Credit 
unions, being democratically structured and often smaller institutions, may provide a framework 
where not only employees, but also customers feel like they “own” the institution. This feeling of 
ownership may improve morale and quality among employees and in the case of credit unions 
encourage greater reliance upon new technologies by customers that may otherwise be shunned for 
being a bit risky (e.g., internet banking).  Credit unions are not the only ones that have tried 
innovative human resource practices. Outside of high technology companies banks have been among 
the quickest to offer ownership and variable pay incentives.2  
     Social networks between employees, customers, employees and customers and even between 
institutions are clearly important sources for loyalty and sometimes needed support. Measuring the 
degree of social networks, or social capital as it is sometimes referred to, is often quite difficult. In 
some respects credit unions are at an initial advantage in that typically they are smaller and often 
                                            
2 Corey Rosen (2002) 
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have close common bonds as part of their original charter. This is evidenced by large numbers of 
members actually volunteering to help run the credit union.3 Democratic decision-making is 
reinforced in many cases by the close proximity in where they live between credit union members 
and staff.  This more organic growth due to social networks may allow for an information advantage 
as well. The motto of the credit unions of “People Helping People” and the traditional role of credit 
unions helping low-income people to gain access to financial intermediation services are at least 
surface indicators of an attempt to build social capital.  
 
Section III: Data and Empirical Approach 
 
     There are two main data sets used in this paper. The first one is much smaller and looks at the 
total population of banks and credit unions in the area that was heavily damaged by Katrina, the 
twelve southern counties of Mississippi and New Orleans. In dollar terms, Hurricane Katrina was 
the greatest natural to ever hit the U.S. The recovery efforts over two years later are on going. 
This data was started by a questionnaire and interviews with credit union and bank presidents 
and employees at both types of institutions.  Approximately twenty percent of the banks and 
credit unions in the affected area responded to the survey by email or through interviews. Data 
for the remaining institutions that were not interviewed were supplemented with data collected 
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA). Matching the data sets required that some useful information in one set 
could not be used, since there was a lack of corresponding data or proxies in the other.  
                                            
3 In the U.S. in 2006 there were about 102,000 volunteers, CUNA (2007). 
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      The second data set covers all credit unions and banks in the United States from 1994 until 
December 2006, also gathered from the FDIC and the NCUA. Altogether there are 267, 678 
observations over the thirteen-year period.  
     A number of different measures of have been used to measure credit union and bank 
performance and strength. Asset growth, returns on assets, variants of the value-added approach 
and assets per employee have all been used in performance studies of financial institutions.4  
Generally the functional forms estimated can be posited as: 
 
Yit = αi + ß X it  + ε it            (1) 
 
The performance indicator, Yit, is the natural logarithm of real assets per employee.  The 
intercept, αi, captures firm specific factors which may be otherwise unseen, while the X matrix 
contains policy variables, state dummies, regional and time dummies to capture exogenous 
contemporaneous shocks. The use of firm specific intercepts helps to eliminate the bias that may 
be due, for example, to larger firms having the ability to use better technology or stronger market 
power. Given the time invariance of some of the key variables, the fixed effects estimates of the 
firm effects would mean these estimates would be unavailable. Using a random effects estimator 
allows to keep the time invariant variables. The X matrix also contains the natural log of assets to 
capture scale effects.5 A dummy for whether the institution was a credit union or a bank was also 
included (coded one if a credit union). The Huber-White sandwich estimator allowed robust 
estimates of the standard errors in the presence of suspected heterogeneity over such a diverse 
                                            
4 See for example, Greer and Rhoades (1977), Lieberman and Asaba (1997), Berger and 
Humphrey (1992, 1997) and Park and Weber (2006).  
 
5 For similar uses of assets as a scale variable see Goddard et al (2002), Huang (2005) and Fried 
and Lovell (1993). 
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range of institutions.6 Potential endogeneity problems may arise from the presence of assets on 
the right hand side. Where data was available, age of the institution, and whether the institution 
was federally or state chartered was also included. To correct for possible non-spherical errors 
terms the instrumental variable technique developed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) is used. This 
technique partitions the right hand side variables such that equation one can be rewritten as: 
Yit = αi + ß X it  + γ Z it + ε it            (2) 
 
Here X it assumed to be exogenous and Z it contains elements that may be endogenous. Using a 
generalized instrumental variable estimator on this equation gives statistics that are 
asymptotically valid. This method allows estimation of the primary variable examined here, the 
time invariant dummy for whether the institution is a credit union or a bank.7          
 
 
Section IV: Empirical Results 
     Summary statistics for the data set on the Hurricane Katrina impacted area are reported in 
Table 1. The data here represent just time periods, May 2005 and May 2006. This period 
straddles the hurricane that happened on August 29, 2005. Data here is for institutions that 
survived and for which data is available for both periods. The number of institutions changed 
over the period as well. There were 16 fewer credit unions a year later due to either closures or 
mergers, all but one of these was in New Orleans. Even though there is a national trend toward 
fewer institutions, this represents a far higher percentage of decline. There was also one new 
bank following the storm in New Orleans.  Although the death toll of 1,836 has been surpassed 
                                            
6 White (1980). 
7 Woolridge 2006, p. 327, Baltagi and Khanti-Akom (1990) and Baltagi (2005). 
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by other natural disasters,8 the insured costs and government assistance are in excess of 135 
billion dollars, over double the amount for the 2001 terrorist attacks.9   The mean amount of 
assets for the 98 credit unions in the sample is 46.9 million dollars (2006 dollars) versus 1,630 
million dollars for the 56 banks in the sample. Clearly with about 35 times the average assets 
banks are larger, in fact the largest bank in the sample has 29.9 billion dollars, which is more 
than the combined assets of all the credit unions. A result similar in relative terms to assets is 
found with employees. The mean number of employees at credit unions is approximately 17 
versus about 27 times that number in banks at about 459. It is interesting to note that the 
minimum number of employees for the credit unions is zero. This low number and overall lower 
figure for credit union employment is partly a reflection of the service given by volunteers.  
Given the large difference in assets, it is not surprising that assets per employee for credit unions 
at about 2 million dollars are less the than 3.2 millon dollars per employee found in banks.  
     Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the period 1994 to 2006 for U.S. credit unions and 
banks. The figures in this table in many ways mirror the statistics in Table 1. The mean amount 
of assets for the 135,244 credit union observations (averaging 10,403 per year over the thirteen 
years) in the sample is 53 million dollars (2006 dollars) versus 864 million dollars for the 
132,434 bank observations in the sample (averaging 10,187 per year over the thirteen years), 
giving a ratio of asset for banks to credit unions of 17 to 1. Similar to the micro data in Table 1, 
there are a number of individual banks with more assets than all the credit unions combined, e.g., 
                                            
8 The death toll figures are argued by many to be quite conservative due the fact that a large 
number of fatalities occurred due to the storm but were attributed to ill health. An example 
would be people who died due to the lack of power in intensive care units or people who died 
due to the lack of relatively routine medical care in the weeks following landfall.  
9 Insurance Information Institute, 2006, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/catastrophes/. 
Congressional Budget Office, 2006, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7027/01-26-
BudgetOutlook.pdf#page=127. 
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the maximum asset figures for bank is at 1.2 trillion dollars versus in 2006 a combined 726 
billion dollars for all credit unions in the same year. The mean number of employees at credit 
unions is approximately 20 versus about 10 times that number in banks at about 191. Assets per 
employee for credit unions at about 2.1 million dollars are less the than 6 millon dollars per 
employee found in banks. Given that there are economies of scale, it is not surprising that banks 
with much larger assets on average have higher ratios of assets per employee. What will become 
clear in later tables is that this advantage does not hold up when considering institutions of 
comparable size and other characteristics.  
    The regressions in Table 3 use the data from pre and post Katrina. This micro data set shows 
consistently that size matters for efficiency. The coefficient on the natural log of real assets 
shows up as significant in all the specifications. The parameter estimates for the credit union 
dummy are all positive and typically strongly significant. The time coefficient is estimated to 
positive and is significant. This is to be expected after discussions with credit union and bank 
presidents about the large influx of insurance money that was deposited in individual accounts 
before actually rebuilding for many took place. The slow pace of rebuilding along the coast 
continues to this day, especially for residential neighborhoods. Higher insurance rates, when 
insurance is even available, uncertainty about building codes and supporting infrastructure have 
caused many to put off rebuilding or decide to move to other locations.  
     Suspecting possible endogeneity of real assets in the equation, the Hausman-Taylor random 
effects estimates are reported in column 5 of Table 3.  Correlations of the exogenous variables all 
appeared fairly strong with the instrumented variable, real assets, except for time. The IV 
estimators, as expected show higher larger standard errors.10 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-
                                            
10 Woolridge 2006, p. 516. 
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square test for possible endogeneity of real assets is negative (χ2 of 0.71 with one degree of 
freedom and a p value of 0.398); hence the random effects model in column 6 where assets is 
treated as an exogenous variable of Table 3 is preferred over column 5. The results in column 6 
for the key variables are almost identical. Whether the firm was in Mississippi or New Orleans 
and the age of the firm did not show up as significant. Having a federal charter showed up as 
significant, perhaps there was greater federal aid given to these institutions.  
     Table 4 contains a number of specifications that use the 1994-2006 data set for credit unions 
and banks.11 Table 4 uses a number of controls (unbalanced firm level effects for 27, 588 credit 
unions and banks, time effects, region and state dummies), to try to capture unobserved variables 
that may relate to managerial efficiency, income of the area, variations in technology, 
macroeconomic shocks, etc. Similar to the findings in the micro data set reported in Table 3, the 
coefficients on real assets and credit unions are positive and significant in all specifications. The 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test for possible endogeneity of real assets is positive (χ2 of 
367.17 with one degree of freedom and a p value of 0.000); hence the random effects model in 
column 5 where assets is treated as an endogenous variable of Table 4 is preferred over column 
4.  The estimates in column 5 are similar in magnitude, sign and significance to those in the other 
columns.  The evidence from this regression, the strongest in statistical terms, shows that once 
you hold constant other factors, such as size and location, that each credit union employee 
handles about $22,934 more a year in assets.12 Given that in 2006 the total full time employment 
                                            
11 It should be noted that some credit unions had a listing of zero employees. As mentioned 
earlier this is most likely a result of volunteer labor running the institution. Not only would this 
understate the amount of effort seen in running the institution, but it would drive to infinity any 
estimates of assets per employee. In order to preclude this possibility a one was assumed to be 
the smallest labor input available to the firm. 
12 To be precise the estimate is $22934.4 more per employee per year. This estimate was made at 
the mean of the sample.  
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in credit unions in the U.S. was 245,954 this relatively small per person advantage adds up to 
about 5.6 billion dollars. Dividing this figure by the average asset per employee for the overall 
sample that includes banks in Table 2, would mean that credit unions would need about 2300 
fewer employees to handle the same number of assets.13 This figure is probably biased down 
somewhat, given that part-time employee figures for credit unions were treated as full time. 
Handling of a larger amount of assets with fewer employees is an important source of cost 
savings. From interviews it was suggested that one reason for this increased efficiency may come 
from an advantage of electronic services for credit unions, since credit union members may feel 
more secure than dealing with a larger institution like a bank where they might feel to have less 
control and also that the average credit union user may be more a sophisticated user of 
electronics in general (Klinedinst, 2007). Another possible reason is there may be a need for 
fewer managerial staff to monitor employees due to a stronger identification with the goals of the 
firm by individual employees in credit unions, something often attributed to helping in the 
success of the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation. 
 
Section V: Policy Implications 
     This paper has analyzed two data sets focusing on the efficiency measure of assets per 
employee to try and answer the question why credit unions, being so much smaller, remain 
resilient and still are the most numerous financial intermediary in the U.S., even after the 
collapse of the U.S. housing bubble.14 The first data set looked at the credit unions and banks in 
the area heavily affected by Hurricane Katrina, before and after the storm. The second data set 
looked at all U.S. banks and credit unions from 1994-2006 to try and see if the results found in 
                                            
13 More precisely, 5640709036 / 2428531= 2322.68. 
14 See FDIC (2010) 
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the micro data set collected from interviews, surveys and online sources would be replicated on a 
much larger scale.  
     Credit unions and banks and their customers and employees suffered enormous losses through 
physical damage and personal losses following Katrina. Being more numerous and often serving 
lower income groups, credit unions based in the sample area, suffered more closures, movements 
out of the area and mergers (16 out of 63 pre-Katrina credit unions). Assets surged by about 24 
percent in the year following Katrina for both banks and credit unions.15 This large infusion of 
assets, from in most cases from insurance payouts, helped the institutions remain liquid.  
     Credit unions actually had a growth of membership of 2.6 percent in the year after the storm, 
mostly from the Mississippi credit unions from an area where there is higher ground and also 
because they absorbed a large number of people who were displaced from. The analysis of 
efficiency in terms of assets per employee (Table 3) showed that size is important. Significantly 
credit unions, when matched with comparable banks, seem to be able to handle more assets per 
employee than banks. The heroism that was displayed by employees and customers of both 
credit unions and banks in response to the disaster was quite impressive. Aid from governmental 
sources, insurance, non profit groups, other branches of the same institution were all important in 
helping theses intermediaries come back. What was remarkable was the network support offered 
to credit unions from other credit unions locally, statewide and nationally. One example of this 
unusual commitment found with the credit unions was a story told by Charles Elliott, President 
and CEO of the Mississippi Credit Union Association: a credit union on the coast severely 
damaged by the storm and unable to offer services through its regular outlets had a manager 
armed with a 45 revolver hand out cash from the back of a pick up truck. Once he had helped 
                                            
15 This is compared to a national growth for both types of institutions in the same period of under 
ten percent.  
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those he could at his credit union, he went on to help another credit union in a similar fashion.16 
Help to credit unions hit by the disaster came in the form of liquidity, expertise, counseling, 
electronic equipment, etc. The social network developed by credit unions both locally, statewide 
and nationally played a key role in allowing the damaged credit unions to get back to normal 
operations.  
     The results for the national sample of credit unions and banks is similar to that found in the 
micro data set. Size is clearly an important predictor of more efficient operations, as measured by 
real assets per employee. Allowing for individual institutional circumstances with a random 
effects estimator and controlling for size, region, state and temporal effects showed that being a 
credit union gave an over $22,000 dollar per employee advantage in the number of assets 
handled. This advantage may spring from a variety of sources described in the cooperative and 
credit union literature. Credit unions have survived continuous competitive conditions for 
decades and are still able to offer products and services to attract 90 million Americans as 
member-owners. Further research would help clarify exactly what are the sources of this 
advantage and commitment. Theoretical and anecdotal evidence point to factors that need to be 
researched that are internal to the organization of credit unions such as managerial techniques 
and goals, but many are also external in part, such as member demographics, restrictive 
legislative practices and credit union support organizations.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
16 Klinedinst (2007) 
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Table 1 
Katrina Area-Summary Statistics17 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Number 
Real Assets 
(2006 dollars) 
630 m. $ 3,200 m. $ 111,964 $ 29.9 b. $ 154 
 Credit Union 
 Real Assets 
46.9 m. $ 183 m. $ 111,964 $ 1.4 b. $ 98 
 Banks 
 Real Assets 
1,630 m. $          5,110 m. $ 22.9 m. $ 29.9 b. $ 56 
Employees 
(FTE) 
177.9 820.8 0 7418 154 
 Credit Union 
 Employees 
17.4 55.1 0 384 98 
 Banks 
 Employees 
458.73 1320.068 12 7418 56 
Assets per 
Employee 
2,428,531 $ 1,439,164 $ 111,964 $ 7,327,731 $ 153 
 Credit Union 
 Asset per emp. 
1,974,568 $ 1,314,219 $ 111,964 $ 7,327,731 $ 97 
 Banks 
 Asset per emp. 
3,214,860 $ 1,310,083 $ 828,956 $ 6,382,334 $ 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
17 New Orleans parish and 12 counties in Mississippi. Counties in Mississippi included were; 
Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Pearl River, Stone, George, Lamar, Forrest, Perry, Greene, Jones 
and Wayne. 
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Table 2 
U.S. Data-Summary Statistics 
(Aggregate of the years 1994-2006) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Number 
Real Assets 
(2006 dollars) 
454 m. $ 8,880 m. $ 0 1.2 tr. $ 267,678 
 Credit Union 
 Real Assets 
53 m. $ 
 
282 m. $ 
 
 0 27.1 b. $ 
 
135,244 
 Banks 
 Real Assets 
864 m. $ 
 
1,260 m. $ 
 
1,222 1.2 tr. $ 132,434 
Employees 
(FTE) 
104.1 1,618.8 1 202,936 267,428 
 Credit Union 
 Employees 
19.6 72.9 1 5647 135,244 
 Banks 
 Employees 
190.5 2,298.2 1 202,936 132,184 
Assets per 
Employee 
4,046,779 $ 12,700 m. $ 
 
0 45.1 b. $18 
 
267,428 
 Credit Union 
 Asset per emp. 
2,109,315 $ 5,790,538 $ 0 1.3 b. $ 
 
135,244 
 Banks 
 Asset per emp. 
6,029,094 $ 180 m. $ 1,222 45.1 b. $ 
 
132,184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
18 This large number is probably due to a merger or acquisition that left the total number of 
employees small on the books, but not in reality.  
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Table 3 
Real Assets per Employee-Pre and Post Katrina 
(Time periods are May 2005 and May 2006. Dependent variable is the natural  
log of real assets per employee. Standard errors are parenthesis19) 
 
 (1)  
GLS 
(2) 
GLS 
(3) 
GLS 
(4) 
GLS 
(5)  
Endogenous 
Random 
Effects 
(6)  
Random 
Effects 
Ln(Assets) 0.279*** 
 (0.036)            
0.271*** 
(0.037) 
            
0.266*** 
(0.034) 
0.264*** 
(.035) 
0.471** 
(0.179) 
0.272*** 
(0.048) 
Credit 
Union 
Dummy 
0.334** 
(0.136) 
0.334** 
(0.135) 
0.408*** 
(0.135) 
0.408*** 
(0.140) 
1.118* 
(0.653) 
0.436** 
(0.185) 
Time 
Dummy  
(1 if 2006) 
.172* 
(0.091) 
.172* 
(0.091) 
.172* 
(0.089) 
.172* 
(0.090) 
.146*** 
(0.034) 
.168*** 
(0.027) 
Mississippi 
Dummy 
 -.060 
(.095) 
-.048 
(.093) 
-.048 
(.093) 
-.113 
(.159) 
-.049 
(.123) 
Federal 
Charter 
Dummy 
  -0.229** 
(.088) 
-0.226** 
(.089) 
-0.180 
(.169) 
-0.226* 
(.120) 
Firm Age    0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
       
N 153 153 153 153 153 153 
R-sq 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 Wald χ2  
86.48 
Wald χ2  
130.57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
19 ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in columns 1-4.  
 17 
Table 4 
Real Assets per Employee-U.S. Data 1994-2006 
(Dependent variable is the natural log of real assets per employee. Standard errors are 
parenthesis20) 
 
 (1)  
Random 
Effects 
(2)  
Random  
Effects 
(3)  
Random 
Effects 
(4)  
Random  
Effects 
(5)  
Endogenous 
Random Effects 
Ln(Assets) 0.338*** 
 (0.004)            
0.342*** 
 (0.004)            
0.345*** 
 (0.004)            
0.346*** 
 (0.005)            
0.384*** 
 (0.002)            
Credit Union 
Dummy 
0.115*** 
(0.012) 
0.129*** 
(0.013) 
0.148*** 
(0.014) 
0.159*** 
(0.014) 
0.271*** 
(0.012) 
Time Dummies  
 
 yes yes yes yes 
Region 
Dummies 
  yes yes yes 
State Dummies    yes yes 
      
      
N 267,425 267,425 267,425 267,425 267,425 
Number of 
Groups 
27,588 27,588 27,588 27,588 27,588 
Wald  χ2 19,050 29,364 29,726 31,648 80,446 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
20 ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in columns 1-4.  
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